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DEATH OF A REVOLUTION

An Analysis of the Grenada Tragedy
and the U.S. Invasion

MUERTE DE UNA REVOLUCION

Una Análisis de la Tragedia de Granada
y de la Invasión Norteamericana

DEATH OF A REVOLUTION



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by Cathy Sunshine and Philip Wheaton January 1984

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
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THE CARIBBEAN



PART ONE

THE REAL REASONS FOR THE INVASION



There were three fundamental reasons for the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983. None of them had to do with the safety of U.S. citizens on the island, nor with any altruistic desire to aid Grenada's neighbors in an hour of need. Rather, these reasons reflected deep-seated fears and beliefs about American power, and about the significance of Grenada's revolution as a symbol for the region.

The first reason was that Grenada, an island of 133 square miles and 110,000 people, violated precepts of North American hegemony dating back to the first three decades of this century, when the U.S. kept the region subservient through its infamous "gunboat diplomacy." From the start, the Bishop government refused to abide by this notion of the Caribbean as an American "backyard" in which Washington sets the political and ideological limits beyond which countries may not go. By establishing a warm friendship with Cuba, which was generous with human and material aid, Grenada defied Washington's unwritten law regarding the isolation of Cuba in the hemisphere.

This rejection of the principle of U.S. hegemony made Grenada a thorn in the side of two successive administrations. EPICA's history, Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution, published in March 1982, details the pattern of U.S. hostility toward the Bishop government, which began under the Carter administration as soon as

Bishop came to power. The incoming Reagan administration openly made the destabilization of Grenada a key part of its strategy. The outlines for such an effort were clearly visible as early as the summer of 1980 -- while Reagan was still a candidate -- and were described in two important Reaganite productions: the Report of the Santa Fe Committee and the video tape Attack on the Americas.

The second reason for the invasion had to do with the political impact and implications of a successful revolution in Grenada. Because the revolution vowed to phase out old political and economic structures and find a new path to development, the Grenadian process set off alarm bells in Washington. The U.S. model of development in the region -- the so-called "Puerto Rican model" of dependent capitalism based on investment by foreign industry -- had failed to address the root causes of Caribbean poverty. Indeed, Puerto Rico today is in an alarming state of massive unemployment and welfare dependency. This failure was underscored after 1980 by the rapid economic decline of Seaga's Jamaica, touted by Reagan as a capitalist "miracle" and as the model for his Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Meanwhile, the Bishop government was racking up an impressive array of achievements, including four successive years of positive economic growth. As summarized by the Seattle Times on November 13, 1983:

Graffiti blossomed around the island during Grenada's revolution.



The New Jewel Movement in just four and one-half years reduced unemployment from 50 percent to 14 percent; established a health care system which provided health and dental care free to all people; reduced illiteracy from 35 percent to 5 percent of the total population; gave equal rights to women; and made thousands of acres of land available to small farmers.

Equally important, Maurice Bishop had won the support of a majority of Grenadians on the island, and wide international respect as well. Although conservative Caribbean politicians denounced the revolution, the possibility of Grenada being viewed by the people of the region as an alternative model of change was extremely worrisome to Washington. Thus it was not enough for the Reagan administration to discredit or isolate the Bishop government; the revolution was a model that had to be destroyed, and destroyed with sufficient force to intimidate anyone who might be thinking of treading a similar path.

In the summer of 1981, then, the Reagan administration began a series of military exercises in the Caribbean to demonstrate its willingness to use force against Grenada. The first and most massive exercise was called Ocean Venture '81, and lasted from August 1 to October 15, 1981. It featured a mock invasion of an Eastern Caribbean island dubbed "Amber and the Amberdines" -- widely understood as



Maurice Bishop

BILL SCHAP

referring to Grenada and its dependency islands, the Grenadines. In the Pentagon's fictional war-game scenario, Amber was to "seize American hostages", after which U.S. forces would invade the island to rescue the hostages and set up a government friendly to the United States. The invasion, rehearsed in detail by U.S. Army Rangers on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, included the actual removal of


Amphibious landing by U.S. naval forces on Vieques Island during Ocean Venture '81.



PTICA

Washington ©

BY MARK ALAN STAMATY ©1983



Americans stationed at the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba, as part of the rescue scenario.

Detailed plans had long been on the books, therefore, to invade Grenada; only the opportunity was missing. The self-destruction of the New Jewel Movement and the assassination of the top leaders provided the opening the Reagan administration needed. Curiously, that opening came at the very moment when Reagan needed it most.

Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 promising to "roll back communism" and reassert American military might. He played to the deepest anxieties of an American public which had never accepted the United States' loss of its post-World War II hegemony (dramatized by the Vietnam defeat), nor the growing international assertiveness of the Third World. Reagan focused these fears on Cuba, casting Fidel Castro as a devil to be exorcised if the American spirit was to be made whole again. As the New York Times editorialized on November 3, 1983:

It was psychologically that the Cubans got to us, exposing a deep-down sense of American inadequacy and weakness... After all is said and done, the real inspiration and justification for the Grenada invasion lies in these false feelings of impotence -- fanned by years of deceptive politicking about American retreats, defeats, and even nuclear inferiority.

By the fall of 1983, Reagan had been in office nearly three years and could not yet claim a single victory against communism or Cuba. Over the previous summer, the Salvadoran guerrillas had made important advances, while the CIA-sponsored "contras" were floundering in their bid to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The use of surrogates and the gradual escalation of U.S. involvement in Central America was not working. But domestic public opinion, growing steadily more opposed to entanglement in Central America, prevented Reagan from making an all-out military push.

Thus the third reason for the Grenada invasion had to do with the political needs and credibility of the Reagan administration. Reagan gambled that a quick, cheap military victory in some part of the world would help Americans to see military intervention in a more favorable light. It was a gamble that he won, at least in the short run.

The Grenada invasion was relatively costless and proved immensely popular. A New York Times editorial of November 10 noted that "Most Americans not only approve, but feel positively invigorated... Years of frustration were vented by the Grenada invasion. So the invasion is finally justified because Americans needed a win, needed to invade someone." Typical of reaction abroad, the Central American publication Mesoamerica simply sniffed, "U.S. Finally Wins a War."

PART TWO

THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE



The first clear sign of internal problems within the New Jewel Movement came in July 1982 with the resignation of Bernard Coard from the party's Central Committee (CC). Coard, then Minister of Finance and Planning and also the Deputy Prime Minister, said he could "no longer work with the group under Bishop's leadership because it was not up to the task of building a true Marxist-Leninist party." (Washington Post, November 9, 1983.)

As early as a year and a half ago, therefore, tensions within the party had already built up to the point of a preliminary split between Prime Minister Bishop and Deputy Prime Minister Coard. Other members of the Central Committee were also dissatisfied with the functioning of the party, which was characterized as lacking in discipline, and with what they saw as a general stagnation of the revolution: a falling-off of popular support, decline in efficiency, etc. What is significant is that CC members interpreted these problems as posing a choice between alternative models of leadership. A CC plenary held two months after Coard's resignation decided that...

The party (stands) at the crossroads. Two routes are open to the party. The first is the petit-bourgeois route...which only leads to temporary relief but will surely lead to the deterioration of the party into a social democratic party and hence into the degeneration of the revolution...The second route is the communist route, the route of collective leadership.

The CC's emphasis on "collective leadership" is key. It reflected a deeper division within the New Jewel Movement which may be seen as a tension between two distinct models of decision-making: popular democracy and democratic centralism. Although this tension was not the ultimate reason for the tragic end of the revolution, the failure to resolve it was an important factor.

In analyzing the conflict between these models, it is important to distinguish it from the question of the basic goals of

the revolution, about which there was broad and nearly universal agreement. These goals included a mixed economy of public, private, and cooperative holdings; a priority on the needs of the poor, particularly in education, health and housing; and a progressive foreign policy, stressing Caribbean unity, Third World dignity, and moral support for national liberation movements. There is no evidence that there was any disagreement about these principles, nor, for that matter, about the government's actual programs or policies. The conflict had to do with the role and structure of the party and the nature of decision-making within the context of the revolution.

"Popular socialism" (or popular democracy, as it was called in Grenada) and "democratic centralism" (or bureaucratic collectivism) have been competing themes throughout the history of revolution. The former places a strong emphasis on the people's direct participation in decision-making, and in some cases, on a dynamic relationship between the people and a charismatic leader. On the other hand, democratic centralism features tight control by the party and its central committee. According to this model, the CC makes decisions democratically, but in practice this has often meant less direct input from the masses, at least in terms of major decisions.

These two elements, mass participation and central decision-making, are as important in Western societies as in revolutionary countries. In both cases, the question is not one of choosing between two pure models, but of how to integrate these two elements into a functioning whole. In terms of the Grenadian situation, the Village Voice (November 8, 1983) described the clash this way:

There were always two tendencies in the Grenadian revolution: on the one hand, the populist nationalist upsurge which led to the revolution in 1979 and the overthrow of the Gairy regime; this was the movement of Maurice Bishop and his supporters such as Unison Whiteman, Jacqueline Creft, and others. The other tendency was represented by



THE BARBADOS NATION

Bernard Coard (with glasses) and Maurice Bishop (clapping) march through St. George's early in the revolution.

Bernard Coard. Whereas Bishop and his people came out of the Black Power tradition, Coard derived his ideological outlook from Jamaican communist currents including the Workers Party of Jamaica, and had far closer affinity to the austere traditions of democratic centralism and, ultimately, of Moscow.

In order to clarify this clash which climaxed in September of this year, we have chosen to use the views of Tim Hector, leader of the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement, to represent the popular democracy position of Bishop and his supporters. To represent the position of democratic centralism favored by the CC, we use quotes taken from documents of the Central Committee (published in the Washington Post on November 9, 1983) and a speech broadcast over Grenadian radio by General Hudson Austin on October 16, 1983.

Writing in an Antiguan newsletter, Outlet, on October 21, 1983, Hector describes the NJM's internal conflict this way:

The essence of the dispute between Bishop and Coard turned on the question of whether as in Bishop's view the mass

organizations of workers, students, farmers, women and youth would be the centers of power, or whether as in Coard's view the Party and its Central Committee would be the center of power.

Hector goes on to describe Bishop as a man who "understood socialism as profoundly as any man I have read", but not as a theoretician or as one concerned with models of socialism as they have emerged throughout history. Bishop's populism was not based on his personal power or charisma, but on his belief in the masses and the value of their direct participation in decision-making. This led, in the summer of 1981, to the creation of structures of popular democracy incorporating local-level Parish Councils and Zonal Councils (See Merle Hodge and Chris Searle, "Is Freedom We Making"). These structures, reminiscent of New England town meetings, were supposed to institutionalize the channels of communication between leadership and people, and provide for increasing popular input into policy.

In contrast to this populist and --according to Hector-- genuinely socialist approach of Bishop, Hector saw



Workers' parish council meeting in 1981.

the New Jewel Movement as heading toward an extreme and negative form of party centralism. He describes a conference held in Grenada in November 1982, during which a Jamaican activist stunned the assembled delegates by omitting mention of Bob Marley or other Reggae artists from a presentation on music as a tool of cultural resistance. Instead, the speaker cited songs of his political party as the high point of cultural resistance in Jamaica. This drew strongly worded responses from two prestigious Caribbean writers at the conference, Earl Lovelace and George Lamming. Afterwards, Hector warned Bishop of his fears that "Stalinism"--an extreme form of centralism--was becoming the preponderant tendency in Grenada, to which Bishop replied, "Our revolution is not going to get bogged down in any ism or schism. The people are the driving force of this Revolution." Hector went on to reflect that Bishop sought "consensus with the Stalinist tendency represented by Coard...that consensus was not wrong, (but) it lasted too long. Therein lies Maurice Bishop's tragic flaw."

On the other side of the issue, most of the NJM Central Committee felt that Bishop--while strong in his link with the masses--was unable to adequately "organize, supervise, and guide the work of the party." At the September 15 plenary session of the CC, members spoke of party cadres being "disenchanted and uninspired" and of "dispiritedness and dissatisfaction among the people." Said one CC member, "We move from crisis to crisis and the crises become more and more frequent." While apparently everyone agreed that the situation was degenerating, there was disagreement on what to do about it. Bishop, on the one hand, called for closer ties with the masses and a "rejuvenation of the revolutionary spirit." General Hudson Austin, on the other hand, charged

that the problem was Bishop and "the steady growth of one-man rule" in the party. In his subsequent radio speech, Austin stated:

The major problem has been a lack of strong leadership from the top and the unwillingness of Comrade Bishop to take firm decisions to solve the problems, while at the same time trying to concentrate power in his own hands. He also simply could not solve all the problems. The party, therefore, became paralyzed--almost unable to take firm action on any matter.

The outcome of this leadership crisis was a CC motion to appoint a dual leadership of the party (not the government) between Bishop and Coard. This was passed by a clear majority vote: nine in favor, one opposed, and three abstentions. Those abstaining were Austin (who had been absent during most of the session), Unison Whiteman, and Bishop himself, who said he needed time to think. According to Donald McPhail, first secretary of the Grenadian Embassy in Cuba, Bishop "said the idea was a good one, but he had practical reservations. He asked for time. He was given time, but the vote was binding." (New York Times, October 30, 1983.)

McPhail also reported that the sharing of power "was to be an internal matter, a party question, not to be publicized", i.e., not shared with the Grenadian people. This little-reported decision proved to be immensely important. First, it apparently reinforced Bishop's fears of a coup by Coard against him, and he evidently began to tell people that Coard planned to assassinate him. Secondly, it angered the people, who reacted violently to Bishop's arrest, expressing not only their love for him but also their anger over the matter having been kept secret. Hudson Austin himself admits such secrecy



Unison Whiteman,
Minister of Foreign
Affairs in Bishop's
Government.

was a mistake in his October 16 radio broadcast:

We have tried to keep the problems away from the masses in order to maintain the unity of the party and the prestige of the Grenadian revolution. The Central Committee took the decision of maintaining the unity of the party at all costs and as it turns out, this position has been incorrect, because it has allowed problems to get worse...

Kenrick Radix,
Minister of Industrial
Development and Fisheries
in the Bishop Government.



Maurice Bishop left Grenada with George Louison after the September 15 CC meeting, for a trip to Cuba, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. During that trip, Bishop's doubts about the dual leadership hardened into a decision to reverse himself, and he returned to Grenada to announce to the CC that he would not accept the majority decision. There were rumors (according to Austin's statement) that Bishop intended to reveal the matter to the public. This challenge of the CC's decision to keep the matter private, plus the charges that Bishop was spreading rumors about Coard planning to kill him, led to the CC's decision to place Bishop under house arrest on Thursday, October 13.

The arrest was a turning point in the scenario, and effectively closed the door to the possibility of a negotiated resolution kept within the party. For Coard and his supporters had reckoned without the people. The situation polarized quickly as the mood on the island grew angry and agitated in the wake of Bishop's arrest. The CC sent party members around to houses and workplaces on Saturday to explain the CC's side of the story, and it also controlled all the broadcasts going out over Radio Free Grenada. But these attempts by the party to stem popular anger were a failure. On

Tuesday, a large pro-Bishop demonstration was held, closing Pearls airport, and a general strike on the island began. Vandalism appeared against NJM offices. By Wednesday, the strike had spread throughout the island.

It was later charged by some people that Bishop and his Cabinet supporters were to blame for the ensuing violence by taking the matter "onto the street"--i.e., by inciting the masses to action. While it is true that several demonstrations were led by Bishop's Cabinet colleagues, Kenrick Radix and Unison Whiteman, there can be no doubt that the force and strength of the demonstrations came from the people, whose anger could not have been contained for long. Grenadians have a long history of popular uprisings against oppressive governments--one has only to recall the three month long island-wide strike which threatened to bring down the Gairy government in 1974.

The crowd's release of Bishop from his imprisonment was the second turning point which virtually ensured that Coard and Austin would have to turn to violence to regain control of the situation. The freeing of Bishop was a flashpoint since it implied that Bishop might be able to reverse the action of the CC and retake power through popular support alone. It is not clear why Bishop and the crowd went to Fort Rupert, since the original plans were for Bishop to address the crowd in St. George's market square. Some observers, however, have suggested that the idea may have been to take Bishop to the hospital first, since he was weak and had not eaten during his imprisonment. The St. George's hospital and the army administrative post at Fort Rupert are located side by side on the same promontory. Thus, while we do not know why they went to the fort--clearly placing themselves in danger of a confrontation with the Army-- it appears that it could have been a last-minute, spontaneous decision.

Two conflicting stories of what happened at the fort have been circulated. The Coard/Austin group -- which subsequently proclaimed itself the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) --insisted in the days that followed that Bishop and his supporters had seized arms from the soldiers and attempted to "take" the fort. However, credible eyewitness reports which we have seen agree that there was no armed action by the crowd nor any attempt to instigate one. It remains unclear who ordered the executions of Bishop and his ministers or when the order was given.

But it can be inferred that the action had the approval of Coard and Austin, who were in control of the Army.

The fact of this violent and shocking ending strongly suggests that the conflict between Bishop and Coard went beyond the issue of popular democracy versus party control, and that personal animosities -- jealousy, ambition, vindictiveness -- were a crucial part of the equation. Indeed, it appears in retrospect that a deep and long-brewing power struggle was also at work. The statements about Bishop becoming swollen with power and grasping for "one-man leadership" appear unsupported in fact, and probably reflect Coard's personal fear and jealousy of Bishop's popularity with the masses. Bishop's close supporters who have survived to tell his side-- Kenrick Radix and George Louison--argue that Coard wanted to remove Bishop because of Coard's own "thirst for power". Radix is quoted in the Village Voice of November 22 as saying:

There were creeping signs a year ago. Coard was power hungry and used his position as finance minister to undermine Maurice ...Coard is 95 percent genius

and 5 percent insane. And the 5 percent took over.

On the other hand, Bishop also apparently let his fears of Coard's intentions distort his response to the question of party leadership, which was not in itself an illegitimate issue. Bishop did not oppose the idea of dual leadership per se, it seems; rather, he feared...

..the party dominated by a Central Committee, and the Central Committee dominated by, at first, a joint leadership of Bishop and Coard, and then, in the end, by Coard alone. (Tim Hector, Outlet, October 28, 1983)

To sum up this tragic struggle, it seems to us that while a case can be made on both sides of the leadership issue--party control versus Bishop's populism--the executions of the leadership cannot be justified by anything, and effectively ended both the revolution and any hope of staying off the long-feared U.S. attack. So strongly did the Grenadian people identify the revolution with Bishop that his death broke their will to resist when the invasion came. Thus the executions

The interior courtyard of Fort Rupert where assassinations occurred, seen after the U.S. invasion.



destroyed the revolution as both an internal reality for Grenada and as a regional symbol of change. What we must remember is that the Grenada revolution was successful between 1979 and 1983 because it was a popular revolution which clearly transcended ideological definitions and inner party discipline.



A CIA Role?

There remain perplexing unanswered questions about the entire series of events which preceded the U.S. invasion of Grenada. How could Bernard Coard, a man who awed others with his political acumen and conscious anti-imperialist views, have failed to see that to move against Bishop would destroy the revolution and open the door to an invasion? How did the Army become so influential, with members sitting on the Central Committee? At what point was the alliance between Coard and the Army formed, and why would Hudson Austin, with long-standing personal loyalty to Bishop, turn against him?

These and many other questions are missing "pieces of the puzzle" that have yet to fall into place. A great many of the pieces do not fit together at this point. Only time will complete the puzzle and reveal, perhaps, the most sophisticated CIA operation to take place in the Western Hemisphere in years.

Two facts can be stated with certainty regarding the role of the CIA in Grenada's demise:

- There were CIA agents in Grenada throughout the years of the revolution, and active attempts were made by the CIA to destabilize the Bishop government.
- The disintegration of the New Jewel Movement and the assassination of Bishop were critical to ensuring a successful invasion, making it possible for Reagan to invade with little Grenadian resistance and therefore little loss of U.S. life.

It appears possible that a center of CIA operations in Grenada was the medical school. Two months after the revolution, fires broke out simultaneously in St. George's and the tourist area near the capital. A medical school student subsequently admitted setting the fires, and said that he had been told to do it by two men from New Jersey. Despite this and other suspicious incidents involving the school, the Bishop government allowed it to stay. It is virtually certain that there were agents at the school posing as faculty or students. Newsweek (November 7, 1983) reported the presence at the school of a "mystery man":

..At the Grand Anse campus an older student named Jim Pfister assured everyone that help was on the way. Pfister was a thin man with a moustache, probably in his late 30s, and even his fellow students found him unusual. He claimed to be a West Point graduate and Foreign Service officer, a U.S. consul in Laos during the Vietnam War, who had quit the State Department to go to medical school. Once the invasion started, he was in constant shortwave radio contact with the advancing troops and seemed to know their moves in advance. Before they arrived, he instructed the other students to prepare for evacuation by putting on long pants and running shoes.

There are other oddities surrounding the medical school and its role in events. The school was founded by the father of Carter administration advisor Peter Bourne, and has ties to political figures within the United States, notably conservative New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato. Both Bournes were involved in "advising" the Revolutionary Military Council after Bishop's death, and helped draft a position paper for the RMC outlining policy positions calculated to placate the Reagan administration.

While the interplay of these relationships is less than clear, it is likely that after four and a half years of nearly unhindered operation in Grenada, the CIA would have been able to penetrate the government and/or the Army to some degree. There were obviously genuine differences among the members of the NJM, of both a personal and a political nature. The CIA has a history of encouraging and deepening such internal divisions, once it has


The Reagan administration has presented no evidence that the American citizens on Grenada, primarily some 800 students at the U.S.-run St. George's University School of Medicine, were endangered --except by the invasion itself.

After Bishop was killed and the Revolutionary Military Council took over,

Pretext #1: The U.S. Citizen Rescue

DEBUNKING THE PRETEXTS FOR THE INVASION

PART THREE



A summary of the CIA's known involvement in Grenada and an analysis of its probable role in recent events is contained in Covert Action Information Bulletin, #20, Winter 1984 (P.O. Box 50272, Washington, D.C. 20004. \$3.00).

- The U.S. Ambassador to France, Evan Galbraith, told French reporters that the invasion had been planned two weeks before the actual date. The statement was hastily retracted.
- While Bishop was under house arrest, according to Adams, unidentified U.S. officials approached the Barbados government about a scheme to intervene and "rescue" Bishop.
- A delegation of British MPs who visited Grenada in early November said Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados told them he knew four weeks earlier (i.e., in early October) of likely trouble in Grenada, and had expected assassinations.

• The Army Ranger battalion which parachuted into Point Salines airport practiced the maneuver more than a month earlier, from September 23 to October 2, at a remote municipal airport in eastern Washington State. The manager of the site says the military specifically sought to avoid publicity about the training, which resembled the Grenada invasion in many details.

President Reagan used three basic justifications for the U.S. invasion of Grenada, code-named "Operation Urgent Fury" by the Pentagon. All by now have been more or less thoroughly debunked by the press and other observers. Nonetheless, the control over independent reporting for the first week of the invasion gave the administration time to implant its version of events firmly in the minds of the American public.

While the extent of U.S. involvement in the breakup of the Bishop government is still unknown, signs are filtering out that U.S. officials "expected" the downfall of Bishop, and that the invasion was planned much farther in advance than the Reagan administration claims. Some of these signs:

- "Top Jamaican officials" interviewed by a Washington Post reporter said that the Reagan administration had been seeking "for several months" to have the Caribbean nations isolate Grenada and to consider military action against the island. The State Department denied the reports.

Fort, where the assassinations occurred. why the crowd carried Bishop up to the particularly the unanswered question of October 19 must be scrutinized closely, Committee itself. Finally, the events of there were collaborators on the Central by the CIA, and it is even possible that Grenadian Army was thoroughly penetrated discord. Some observers suspect that the weaken the group by creating confusion and penetrated a target group, in order to

THE PLAIN DEALER
CLEVELAND, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983
THE LARGEST NEWSPAPER IN THE CLEVELAND AREA

Rangers practiced assault Sept. 23

Four weeks before a possible invasion of Grenada, U.S. Army Rangers practiced a complex assault on a remote municipal airport in eastern Washington State. The manager of the site says the military specifically sought to avoid publicity about the training, which resembled the Grenada invasion in many details.

The Army Ranger battalion which parachuted into Point Salines airport practiced the maneuver more than a month earlier, from September 23 to October 2, at a remote municipal airport in eastern Washington State. The manager of the site says the military specifically sought to avoid publicity about the training, which resembled the Grenada invasion in many details.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

U.S. Rangers boarding helicopter in Grenada.

the New York office of the medical school received an anxious call from the U.S. Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Milan Bish. Bish wanted officials of the school to travel to Barbados and publically request a U.S. intervention to protect the students. The officials refused.

Over the weekend before the invasion, the chancellor of the medical school, Dr. Charles Modica, polled the students on how many wished to leave. Only 10 percent voted to leave, while 90 percent voted to stay. Five hundred parents of the students in the U.S. cabled President Reagan, begging him not to take any "precipitous" action. The RMC pressed assurances on school officials that the students were safe, while two staffers of the U.S. Embassy in Barbados visited Grenada and said they could see no need to evacuate the students.

Dr. Modica was also in constant communication with the State Department during the 48 hours prior to the invasion, asking if any intervention was planned. He was repeatedly told that nothing of the sort was contemplated.

Later, confronted with charges that it failed to look for any peaceful means of evacuating the students, the Reagan administration stated that the Grenada airport (the old airport, Pearls) was closed on Monday, the day before the invasion. In fact, it was open. The RMC said that anyone could leave who wished to, and four charter planes flew in and departed on that day, carrying out foreign nationals.

The problem was not with the airport but with LIAT, the only commercial airline to regularly serve Grenada. LIAT is jointly owned by the governments of the Eastern Caribbean, whose representatives, as it happened, had just concluded a meeting with U.S. officials in Barbados on Friday, October 21. At that meeting, the U.S. officials successfully urged the Caribbean heads of government to sign a letter of invitation inviting the United States to invade Grenada. The other major decision taken at the meeting was to cut air and sea links with Grenada; accordingly, LIAT announced that all flights were suspended. Not only was the Reagan administration not interested in

First Evacuees Arrive in U.S.; Students Safe

Weather
Tides: Low 11:30, High 12:30
Sun: 6:30, Moon: 11:30
Wind: 10-15 mph, Gusts 20-25
Temp: 75-85, Humidity 70-80
10th Year No. 225

The Washington Post

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1983

U.S. Invades Grenada, Fights Cubans; Reagan Cites Protection of Americans

U.S. Says Aim Is To Restore Order 2 U.S. Fatalities Are Reported



By Jim Hume
An American force of up to 1,000 Marines and Rangers invaded the island of Grenada and fought a battle with Cuban forces at a school at dawn yesterday, killing two people and the capture of an American-run medical school in an action that President Reagan said he had ordered to protect the more than 1,000 students.

evacuating the students; it took steps to ensure that the students could not leave, since their presence on the island was key to justifying the invasion.

Confronted with these inconsistencies, the administration has cited the obvious joy of the students upon their arrival home as emotional if not logical proof that an invasion was necessary. Left unstated is the fact that it was the invasion itself which placed the students under direct military attack. According to the students' recollections, they huddled under their beds, terrified, as they heard the planes swoop down. At the Grand Anse campus of the school, the Marines charged ashore, screaming "Freeze! Friend or foe?" Thus the students' relief at being "rescued" must be seen in the context of the actual danger they experienced and the fear they felt at being caught in the cross-fire of the U.S. attack.

Finally, if the citizen rescue had been the real motivation, it would be logical to expect that U.S. forces would withdraw from Grenada as soon as the Americans had been evacuated from the island. This, of course, has not happened.

Pretext #2: The "Invitation" from the OECS

The Reagan administration has referred to an "invitation" from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) requesting the United States to intervene in Grenada. However, the OECS charter provides only for arrangements for collective security against external aggression. There was no external aggression except that of the United States. It also states that such decisions must be unanimous among the seven members. Three of these members (Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Montserrat) did not vote for the invasion, while three of the countries which did join the action (the United States, Jamaica and Barbados) are not members of the OECS.

When the leaders of the OECS countries met in Barbados on that fateful Friday, they found there, to their surprise, Prime Minister Edward Seaga and U.S. Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean Milan

Bish--neither of whom have any relationship to the OECS. The meeting listened to a consultant analyze in detail why an invasion would be illegal and in violation of existing treaties. At that moment, with the invasion plan hanging in the balance, Seaga and Bish spoke up, urging the leaders to "invite" the United States to intervene.

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, a Reagan devotee, is currently Chairperson of the OECS. She had come to the meeting armed with a letter of invitation which had been helpfully drafted in advance by the State Department. All that remained was for the Caribbean leaders to sign the letter, which they did.

The leaders obviously were aware that their deal with the United States would not please the rest of the region. After signing the request, they journeyed to Trinidad where an emergency summit of CARICOM (the regional organization of the English-speaking Caribbean) had been convened to consider the Grenada crisis. There they said not a word about the invasion plans nor even mentioned their meeting with the United States. Prime Minister George Chambers of Trinidad --Grenada's closest neighbor-- publically confirmed this deception.

Why were the Caribbean leaders so ready and willing to step into the role of U.S. puppets? The answer lies in the peculiar nature of politics in the post-colonial Caribbean. Barely subsisting on banana and sugar exports in a recession-struck world market, these islands are mired in an underdevelopment which the neo-colonial generation of leadership has utterly failed to address. Politically, their time is running out. Meanwhile, Grenada's achievements in education, health and economic growth have attracted attention throughout the region, suggesting an alternate path to development. For the conservative guardians of the neo-colonial reality, the Grenadian "model" was too great a threat. It had to be eliminated.

The alliance with Reagan was a natural

one. Most of the Caribbean leaders who joined the invasion had earlier been elected with at least tacit encouragement from Washington. In the case of Seaga, the United States orchestrated his electoral campaign. Others, like John Compton of St. Lucia and Eugenia Charles of Dominica, promised their electorates that aid and investment would flow from the United States if they, the conservative candidates, were elected. The windfall did not materialize, but the leaders continued building on their friendship with Reagan, having staked their political viability on aid from Washington. The Reagan administration, for its part, was determined to surround Grenada with conservative, U.S.-aligned states.

This marriage of convenience took on an overtly military character in October 1982 with a "Security and Military Cooperation" pact between five of Washington's Caribbean allies. The five --Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua-- are not equivalent to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, since Barbados does not belong to the OECS, while three OECS members (Grenada, Montserrat, and St. Kitts-Nevis) are not included in the pact. Rather, the

regional defense force, as it is called, basically represented a U.S.-inspired alliance of the Eastern Caribbean's most conservative states. The force is headquartered in Barbados, and is funded by the United States through military aid to the respective islands.

Although the United States referred to the force as a "Coast Guard", its real purpose was revealed publically when Prime Minister Vere C. Bird of Antigua boasted that the force would be used to keep the members' governments from being overthrown. "In this region we cannot afford to have another Cuba or Grenada," said the aging Bird..."The whole idea behind the defense force is that if you get through today in your own island (i.e., if revolutionaries take power) don't forget there will be forces in all the other islands and you will have to answer to them."

So for the regional politicians, nervous about domestic opposition, the defense force was a welcome bulwark for their rule. But for the Reagan administration, the formal military agreement between Grenada's conservative neighbors had an additional purpose -- one which was fulfilled on October 25, 1983.

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica with President Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and other Cabinet members at the White House, 10:00 a.m. October 25, hours after the U.S. landing on Grenada.



WHITE HOUSE PHOTO



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

U.S. military plane lands on runway of Grenada's nearly-completed airport as Cuban detainees stand by.

Pretext #3: Grenada as a Soviet/Cuban Military Base

With both the student-safety pretext and the OECS invitation having been largely discredited within 48 hours after the invasion, the Reagan administration shifted to an after-the-fact argument: that the U.S. had arrived "just in time" to prevent a Cuban takeover of the island and from there, the rest of the Caribbean.

The two pieces of evidence proffered for this were the new international airport being built with Cuban help, and a cache of weapons stockpiled near the airport site. The airport under construction at Point Salines was first recommended by international studies a decade ago as necessary if Grenada was to break out of poverty and underdevelopment. Until now, the only way to reach Grenada has been to take a small LIAT shuttle plane from Barbados or Trinidad and land at the primitive Pearls airstrip, which lacks lights or navigational aids. Although a new airport had long been desired, it was only when the Bishop government took over in 1979 that the dream was made a reality. Grenada sought funds for the airport project from the United States, but was turned down. It then turned elsewhere and found support from fifteen countries, including Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, the European Economic Community nations--and

Cuba, which provided some 600 skilled workers for the project.

There are two kinds of airports in the Caribbean: new airports and old airports. Those built during the colonial period are like Pearls: limited airstrips intended to service a small traffic of colonial administrators, not a modern tourist trade. Those built since the Second World War are large, international facilities with runways the necessary length to handle wide-bodied jets (9,000-11,000 feet.) The airport under construction at Point Salines was to be 9,800 feet, comparable to other modern airports in the region.

No country except the United States viewed the airport as having nefarious military purposes. The New York Times of November 3, 1983 noted that

The claim of military purpose has been denied by a source that is hardly pro-Communist: the Plessey Company, the British contractor managing the airport construction. It said the airport was designed for tourism and had none of the standard military features. The British Government underwrote the financing and would not have done so if there had been a military aspect.

What apparently convinced many Americans that the threat from Grenada was real was the "huge arms cache" which the U.S. forces supposedly discovered after the capture of the airport. But when reporters were finally allowed into Grenada and taken to see the notorious warehouses, this is what they found:

The weapons in one of the warehouses turned out to be sacks of rice and cans of sardines. Another had truck parts. A third was filled with canteens and clothing. As for the three warehouses that did have weapons--they weren't stacked to the ceiling, as the president said. They were about one-fourth full. Many of the rifles were made in 1870--old breech-loading saddle guns. Others were WWII vintage. Lots of Saturday Night Special pistols. But very little modern weaponry. It was an arsenal, all right, but you'll find a bigger bang for your buck in any American gun shop. (Mike Royko, Chicago Sun Times, Nov. 1, 1983)

The Reagan administration claims it found a total of about 6,300 rifles in Grenada, including those recovered from the Grenadian Army. These, as well as smaller numbers of mortars, submachine guns, and rocket propelled grenades, were subsequently displayed in Washington and were called by Vice-President Bush "an awesome display of arms." What were they for? The answer is to be found in Grenada's actual defensive needs. Most Grenadians were convinced that the United States would eventually invade the island. They also believed --naively, it seems, in

retrospect-- that they could repel such an invasion if they were prepared. Thus in addition to a 2,000-3,000 man army, the country was building a citizen militia which had reached some 3,000-5,000 persons. A count of 6,000 weapons is not inconsistent with this state of readiness.

Because of the split within the New Jewel Movement, however, these weapons were not in the hands of the militia when the invasion came, nor did most militia members fight. Before Bishop's death, the Grenadian Army had collected the militia weapons from their depots. This was a logical move in the light of what followed, since the militia--made up of ordinary Grenadians--could be expected to remain loyal to Bishop. According to an American observer, during the four-day curfew which followed Bishop's death, the Army moved these weapons in convoys down the Grand Anse road to the Point Salines area. Thus what seemed to be a heavy "Cuban" stockpile of arms around the airport was actually the weapons of the militia, which had been demobilized by the Grenadian Army preceding the invasion.

As far as the claims that the Cubans intended to take over the Caribbean from Grenada, this would be laughable if not so tragic a fabrication. Grenada had no air force. Its sea-going fleet consisted of several leaky fishing boats. The most impressive military hardware found and subsequently displayed in Washington were anti-aircraft guns--defensive weaponry by definition. And if Cuba had suddenly decided to "take over" the region, why mount such an effort from Grenada? Why not from Cuba? The contention was so absurd that little was heard about it after Reagan's initial speech which won the hearts and minds of the American public two days after the invasion.

PART FOUR

THE HONORABLE ROLE OF CUBA

Perhaps the greatest irony in all this dirty business is that Cuba, falsely maligned by President Reagan as the "aggressor", was one of the few actors to speak truthfully and straightforwardly about events as they unfolded. Fidel Castro made Cuba's position clear through a widely-circulated series of communiques, statements, and a press conference with Western journalists in Havana. Not only has no false statement been identified in

any of these documents, none has been charged.

Three key points emerge from an analysis of what the Cubans said and did. The first is that Castro's government was taken by surprise and was extremely dismayed by the split within the NJM and the killing of Bishop. In a lengthy statement on the subject, Castro said:





Repatriated Cubans arrive home: ambulances carry Cuban workers wounded in the U.S. invasion from evacuation planes to Havana hospital.

After Bishop's death and Cuba's statements (expressing displeasure over the killings) relations between our party and the new Grenadian leadership were very cold and somewhat strained.

This reflected, among other things, the personal closeness and affection between Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop, and the genuine shock and grief felt throughout Cuba at Bishop's death. In his press conference Castro said:

We felt that Bishop was the right leader for the country. He had tremendous international prestige and was a very intelligent person. Moreover, he was not an extremist; he was a revolutionary who fully understood his country's situation, and we felt he was leading the country well. He was responsible for Grenada's having scored great achievements. Grenada was receiving broad international cooperation and its Gross National Product was growing. He seemed an exceptional person and the right man for the process in Grenada.

The Coard/Austin takeover put Cuba in an extremely difficult position. Castro had no desire to aid the RMC, which had killed his friend Bishop. Yet to evacuate the Cubans on the island in the face of the expected U.S. attack would have been seen as an act of cowardice and of abandoning the Grenadian people in their darkest hour. Therefore the second point to emerge was Castro's decision not to help the Grenadian Army defend the island, but to order the Cuban citizens on the island to defend themselves against the attack. As the U.S. flotilla drew near to Grenada, Castro stated:

I consider that to organize an immediate evacuation of our personnel at a moment when North American warships are approaching would be highly demoralizing and dishonorable for our country before world opinion.

..I understand how bitter it is for you, as it is for us here, to risk the lives of our compatriots in Grenada after the gross errors of the Grenadian party and the tragic developments to which they gave rise. But our position there has been honorably clarified and received with great respect everywhere. It is not the new Grenadian government we must think of now, but of Cuba, its honor, its people, and its moral combativeness.

Castro then transmitted to the RMC his rejection of Gen. Austin's appeal for Cuban help in defending the island:

- That our force (there), essentially made up of civilian construction workers, is too small to be considered as a significant military factor vis-a-vis a large-scale U.S. invasion.
- That sending reinforcements is impossible and unthinkable.

- That the people's estrangement on account of the death of Bishop and the other leaders...considerably weakens the country's defense capabilities, a logical consequence of the serious errors made by the Grenadian revolutionaries...

- That the Grenadian government may try to prevent affording a pretext for intervention by publically offering and reiterating total guarantees and facilities for the security and evacuation of U.S., British, and other foreign nationals.

- That if, however, an invasion were to take place anyway, it is their duty to die fighting, no matter how difficult and disadvantageous the circumstances may be.

- That the Cuban personnel have been instructed to remain in their camps and to continue their labors on the airport. That they will take defensive measures and fortify their position as far as possible so as to be prepared in case of a surprise outside aggression...

Castro's instructions to the Cubans in Grenada then clarified the third major point: that their actions were to be purely defensive in nature, and that the Cubans were not to shoot first nor interfere with the peaceful evacuation of


Americans from the island.

If the United States intervenes, we must vigorously defend ourselves as if we were in Cuba, but only in our camps and workplaces, and only if we are directly attacked. I repeat: only if we are directly attacked. We would thus be defending ourselves, not the (Grenadian) government or its deeds.

..If the Yankees land on the runway section near the university or on its surroundings to evacuate their citizens, fully refrain from interfering.

On Saturday, October 22, at 9:00 p.m., Castro sent a message to the U.S. government through the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, stating that Cuba was as concerned for the safety of Cuban nationals in Grenada as the U.S. was about Americans on the island. The message suggested maintaining contact between Cuba and the United States in order to cooperate in ensuring the safety of foreigners in Grenada "without violence or intervention into the country."

When the attack came, the Cubans followed Castro's instructions and did not fire until fired upon. The construction workers have related how, after assuming their defensive positions, they watched the U.S. paratroopers float down to the runway in the pre-dawn hours of Tuesday morning, harassed only by Grenadian sniper fire. The attackers advanced quickly upon



Graffiti in U.S. soldiers' barracks at Point Salines, Grenada.

CORINNE JOHNSON

the Cuban positions, since one of the first military objectives of the U.S. forces was to capture the Point Salines airport site to use as a base for subsequent operations. The Reagan administration's response to Cuba's message of Saturday the 22nd was delivered at 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday --after the Cuban workers had been under U.S. fire for one and a half hours.

Two days before the actual invasion, while the U.S. naval flotilla was steaming toward Grenada, the Cubans had moved their doctors from other parts of Grenada down to Point Salines and set up a rudimentary field hospital. There the doctors received the wounded during the fighting and attempted to treat them, despite the lack of medicines, bandages, and other medical supplies. According to Cuban doctor Gustavo Martinez:

We did what we could with the little we had. There (at the field hospital) compañeros arrived wounded by projectiles, by gunfire or mortars which fractured bones and left limbs hanging by tendons. We did the best disinfection we could under the circumstances...there was no alcohol, so we had to use rum for the disinfection of wounds and for injections...

Many Americans were surprised and angered by the resistance offered by the Cubans to the invasion force--a resistance which cost some American lives. As one U.S. Ranger told EPICA in Spokane, Washington, on November 18:

Why did the Cubans resist when they knew 48 hours before that the invasion was coming, because it was the Cubans who caused the deaths of the American troops, including a close buddy of mine?

Similarly, President Reagan, in his post-invasion speech, pursed his lips and proclaimed it "regrettable" that Castro had ordered the Cubans to fight. This presumption of automatic capitulation is apparently based on the idea that the United States has the right to intervene in the Caribbean when it chooses, and that those attacked have the responsibility to offer no defense. Full of praise for the patriotism and bravery of American boys in Lebanon, Reagan denies the possibility of such honorable qualities in Cubans.

Within 48 hours, the Cubans' ammunition had run out and most of the 636

construction workers were being held captive by the U.S. military. The treatment of the Cubans in detention has gone virtually unreported in the U.S. press, but has been detailed in numerous interviews by the prisoners since their repatriation to Cuba.



Cuban detainees.

All speak of the brutal conditions of their detention in the barbed wire enclosures at Point Salines. On the ground with no roof over their heads, they were exposed to the burning Grenadian sun and heavy tropical rains. They were not allowed to wash. The Cubans were surrounded at all times with armed guards and were even accompanied by Marines, pointing their guns threateningly, when they used the latrines. In addition to the threats and the humiliation, the guards attempted psychological torture by telling the prisoners that Cuba no longer cared about them, that they would be imprisoned back in Cuba, etc., in an attempt to destroy the Cubans' morale.

Also unreported in the U.S., but mentioned by numerous Cubans, were the attempts to solicit defectors to the United States. During their interrogation by the U.S. military and the CIA, the Cubans were pressured to accept asylum in the United States, and were enticed by offers of jobs at high salaries. This is not surprising given the CIA's ongoing preoccupation with nabbing defectors from communist countries and the propaganda windfall such a defector would have represented in terms of the Grenada invasion. However, not a single Cuban accepted the U.S. offer. As one said, when told by an American that he would be imprisoned in Cuba, "I would not leave my country for anything in the world. When I return, my people will be waiting for me."

PART FIVE

THE FUTURE OF GRENADA: PARALLELS WITH THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The sole power in Grenada at this writing is the United States. Despite surface moves toward phasing out the U.S. presence and establishing an interim government composed of Grenadians, the U.S. military remains in firm control of the island--two months after the original "rescue" mission.

For purposes of international image, the United States decided to use Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General of the island, to provide a facade of legitimate authority. This post--technically the British Queen's representative--is purely ceremonial and a symbolic vestige of British colonialism. It carries no executive or civil authority except, possibly, to make a representation to the Queen. Scoon has said it was he who requested the Americans to intervene in Grenada. However, he had no authority to do this; he could only have requested London to intervene, which he did not do.

When the U.S. forces found Scoon in his home in St. George's, they whisked him off to the aircraft carrier the USS Guam, where he remained for several days. He was then brought back to the island to front for the U.S., his first act being to declare a state of emergency so the U.S. military could begin detaining and interrogating the population.

On November 15, five members of a nine-member "Advisory Council" were sworn in as a provisional government that will run Grenada until elections are held. The group is composed primarily of technocrats, several of whom are well known in international circles. While there was no public challenge of the Council members' intellectual credentials, there was considerable doubt as to either their autonomy or the legality of their rule. The Council's authority to govern seems to hang on the legitimacy of powers being assumed by Scoon, who "appointed"

U.S. military police search residents of Santo Domingo after the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic.



them. In fact, their only real power derives from being backed by the U.S. military, which is acting through them.

Several days after the swearing-in of the Advisory Council, a European diplomat in Grenada told the Washington Post that the government on the island "is still very much headed by" Charles Gillespie, the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and Major General Jack Farris, the U.S. military commander. "The sad fact is that they look like being the government behind the government here for a long, long time," the diplomat said.

Grenada has therefore taken a giant step backward into the past: into a moribund colonialism (represented by Scoon, although without British backing) in partnership with imperialism (represented by the U.S.). It is on this inauspicious beginning that "democracy", we are told, will be built.

However, hairline cracks have already appeared in the facade masking U.S. control of the island. Anthony Rushford, the British constitutional expert who had been advising Sir Paul Scoon and whose prestige lent some legitimacy to the interim government, has resigned, reportedly angry over Scoon's failure to give any real authority to the Advisory Council. His resignation marks the first open protest at the puppet nature of the interim government. Grenadian technocrat Alistair McIntyre earlier turned down an appointment to head the Advisory Council, but excused himself on the basis of ill health.

In projecting what Grenada's future may be, it is instructive to draw parallels with the last major U.S. military intervention into the Caribbean: the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic.

The first parallel has to do with legitimizing the invasion through the appearance of collective action. In the case of Grenada, the U.S. towed along 300

Caribbean troops as a "Caribbean Peace Force" which was brought in after the initial assault and given non-combat responsibilities. In 1965, similarly, 22,000 U.S. Marines were well into their military occupation of Santo Domingo before troops for the "InterAmerican Peacekeeping Force" could be hastily solicited from a few conservative Latin states.

A second parallel which is still emerging concerns the establishment of a post-invasion "new regime" dominated by the United States. In Grenada, as in the Dominican Republic, this is accomplished through a "carrot and stick" approach: a combination of aid and repression.

A basic element of the repression side of the strategy is the construction of a police force which will put down domestic resistance and wipe out every spark of the old popular movement. After the Dominican invasion the U.S. brought in Dan Mitrione, a USAID police training specialist, to train and reorganize the Dominican police force. These police then conducted arrests, interrogations, beatings and killings of Dominicans during the repressive twelve years which followed the invasion.

In Grenada, the U.S. military immediately began systematic detentions and interrogations of the Grenadian population. According to the Washington Post, the sweep focused on "citizens suspected or accused of sympathizing or having had ties with the government of slain prime minister Maurice Bishop" or the Coard/Austin military council. The newspaper also mentioned that the interrogation by U.S. Army Intelligence centered on the detainees' "political activities and beliefs and their potential threat to the establishment of a pro-western government" in Grenada.

During their interrogation, Grenadians and others were held in barbed wire enclosures at Point Salines and slept in wooden packing crates, according to human rights delegations which visited the island. While the U.S. had criticized Bishop's government for holding detainees, soon after the invasion Richmond Hill prison filled with "security detainees" being held by the United States (48 as of late November). Family homes and other private property were searched and ransacked by U.S. troops who claimed to be looking for Cubans or "leftists".

PEOPLE OF GRENADA

**YOUR CARIBBEAN NEIGHBORS WITH
U.S. SUPPORT HAVE COME TO
GRENADA TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY
AND INSURE YOUR SAFETY.**

One dramatic example was the raiding of the Pope Paul's Ecumenical Center, a church-run center on the island. "Our company headquarters up in Gouyave had heard that this place was a center for communist propaganda," a U.S. staff sergeant explained to reporters. He mentioned finding materials including books on Honduras and El Salvador, a map of Puerto Rico, Cuban literature and "a list of Spanish-type names". On the basis of this, the U.S. military ransacked the center, evicted the staff and stationed heavily armed combat troops inside.

The original pretext of rescuing students thus faded into oblivion as the U.S. presence evolved from conquering army to thought police. The occupation of the island has made quite clear the real target of the invasion: not the Coard/Austin junta, but the Bishop government and its supporters.

Foreigners living and working in Grenada were also interrogated, and hundreds have been expelled or asked to leave. This includes not only Cuban construction workers, doctors and technicians, but also Europeans, West Indians from other islands, and a handful of Americans. One publicized case involved a West German doctor, Regina Fuchs, who had been working in a medical clinic under the Bishop government's Ministry of Health. She was arrested by the U.S. military and held in solitary confinement in prison for four days while being interrogated by Americans in both civilian and military dress, one of whom said to her, "Come on now, this isn't the first time you've been interrogated by the CIA." The interrogation focused on Fuchs' "past, her youth in Berlin, her associates when she was in medical school, and her politics in Germany." Her questioners had what she believes was a file of information about her from West Germany. This suggests a rather sophisticated intelligence operation for tiny Grenada and reflects the extent to which these interrogations have gone. The CIA was very active in Santo Domingo after the 1965 invasion as well.

So far, only non-Grenadians have been expelled from the island. We can expect, however, that unreconstructed supporters of the New Jewel Movement will eventually be forced out, either as deportees or encouraged with easy visas to the United States. Many have already been fired from their jobs in the civil service. After the Dominican Republic invasion, the United States expelled thousands of members of the PRD party of Juan Bosch, who had been democratically elected in



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

U.S. Marine takes cover during "clearing" operation in Grenada. The tourist and residential area of Grand Anse was heavily damaged in the invasion.

1962 and whose supporters staged the uprising to return him to power in 1965. This massive emigration of PRD supporters was facilitated by giving them visas to the United States outside of normal immigration quotas, so that tens of thousands of Dominicans moved to New York City, where the Dominican population today numbers over 800,000.

It can also be expected that, as in the Dominican Republic, a U.S.-trained Grenadian force will eventually replace U.S. personnel in carrying out repression on the island. The Reagan administration has designated \$15 million for training and equipping a new Grenadian police force and army. The island's police and prison service has already been purged to remove personnel loyal to the Bishop government or who received training in East Bloc countries. Non-Grenadians--police and prison officials on loan from Barbados and St. Lucia--have been brought in to fill the posts of Police Commissioner and Commissioner of Prisons and their respective deputies.

The other side of this control strategy is the economic side. In the Dominican Republic this consisted of three main elements:

- A huge increase in U.S. investments, especially by large multinationals in major export industries. New laws were passed under the U.S.-aligned government in order to offer incentives such as low wages and tax holidays to U.S. corporations.

- Massive aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID pumped \$500-600 million into the Dominican Republic from 1962-1967, the largest per capita USAID program in Latin America. In addition to police training, USAID entirely funded the construction of an infrastructure needed by foreign investors, including roads, lights, water, etc.

- Penetration of the Dominican labor movement and destruction of independent, militant labor unions by the CIA and AIFLD, in cooperation with the Gulf + Western Co. and the Balaguer government.

In Grenada, the creation of a new economic order is doubly important to Washington. Not only is it a means of political control, but the Reagan administration views the rebuilding of Grenada as a fresh


sector. A U.S. government inter-agency team (dominated by USAID) visited Grenada from November 17-19, tendering its subsequent findings in a report entitled "Prospects for Growth in Grenada: The Role of the Private Sector."

The team's recommendations follow familiar lines. Four basic "areas to be explored" include revising investment and tax codes to favor private enterprise; developing a labor code to ensure a compliant labor force and qualify Grenada for the Caribbean Basin Initiative; selling off public sector enterprises to private interests; and eliminating the state's role in marketing imports.

Based largely on interviews with the Grenadian business sector, which has traditionally made its profits through commerce, the report bemoans the Bishop government's control over the critical imported necessities of rice, sugar, powdered milk, cement, fertilizer, and industrial inputs. Not only were prices fixed and profits for the private sector on these items "exceptionally thin", but "some of these goods were procured from communist countries." The existence of public sector enterprise is another irritant for the inter-agency team, although 60 percent of Grenada's economy remained in private hands during the revolution. The report emphasizes that such state-built ventures as the AgroIndustry Plant, the Fish Processing Plant, the state farms and the Grenada Resorts Corporation infringe upon the prerogatives of the private sector, and should either be abolished or sold to private interests.

These same priorities are reflected in USAID's proposed \$20 million master plan for Grenada. The nine-point proposal emphasizes the funding of infrastructure --essential for foreign investment-- and the restructuring of the economy through lifting price controls on basic foodstuffs, reducing import duties, eliminating state sector enterprises, and offering incentives to private foreign investment.


These are the very same policies which have been such a miserable failure in Seaga's Jamaica. Despite lavish U.S. bilateral aid and \$698 million in IMF loans, Jamaica now suffers from a falling GNP, 30 percent unemployment, and a staggering debt. With the market opened up to imports, prices for food and consumer goods have soared, and the mood in Jamaica is one of frustration and pessimism.



opportunity to prove the superiority of its free-market economic model in the Caribbean. Anxious to dissuade countries from experimenting with Cuban-style alternatives, President Reagan has long sought a capitalist "showcase" for the region. Seaga's Jamaica was supposed to fill this role but has been an abysmal economic failure.

Now, Washington seems poised to try its economic medicine in Grenada. The groundwork is being laid for a major restructuring of the Grenadian economy, focusing, predictably, on the private

As with Jamaica, the Reagan administration has launched a major push to lure U.S. investors to its new client state. A group of 125 business leaders were hosted at the White House on December 6 for a special briefing on investment opportunities in Grenada. Apparently, these are envisioned mainly in tourism and agro-industries; Grenada has neither the minerals nor the vast tracts of prime agricultural land which have been so lucrative for U.S. corporations in the Dominican Republic. The administration's boosterism of opportunities in Grenada seems slightly forced. Are U.S. investors really going to rush to a distant island for the sake of growing cut flowers for export? How much profit is there in grinding and processing cloves? It appears likely that the major investment we will see in Grenada will be in land speculation associated with tourism.



Above and below right: Propaganda posted around St. George's by U.S. psychological operations battalions.


As in the Dominican Republic, the labor movement in Grenada must be brought under U.S. control to attract foreign investment and, more importantly, to prevent a resurgence of working-class radicalism. The inter-agency team calls for AIFLD, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, to "restructure" the Grenadian labor movement. A joint operation of USAID and the AFL-CIO, AIFLD has worked with the Central Intelligence Agency throughout Latin America and the Caribbean to penetrate and control labor unions for political purposes.

The report confirms what the Bishop government had long known--that AIFLD

maintained close contact with several Grenadian labor unions throughout the years of the revolution. These AIFLD-linked unions were implicated in a number of attempts to destabilize the Bishop government. Now, the report notes, there is a vacuum in the leadership of the trade union movement since two union leaders died on October 19 (Vincent Noel and Fitzroy Bain) and others were arrested and detained after the invasion. Unless this vacuum is filled, union members "will be susceptible to radical organizers...AIFLD should take the lead in restructuring and training the unions as quickly as possible."

The last parallel with the Dominican invasion concerns the promised "return to democracy" via supervised elections. In the case of the Dominican Republic, "free" elections were held in 1966 and the U.S.-approved candidate, Joaquin Balaguer --vice-president under the old dictator Trujillo--was elected.

Let us assume for the moment that at least the first election was fair (the charge of electoral fraud was officially made in the two subsequent elections of Balaguer in 1970 and 1974.) Dominicans had watched in horror as at least 3,000 people were killed by invading U.S. forces in the bloody spring of 1965. Thousands of members of Juan Bosch's opposition party had been shipped off to the United States, and repression was systematic on the streets of Santo Domingo. Finally, there was clearly no economic future in the Dominican Republic for anyone who did not go along with the new order. Under these conditions, then, one can claim that there were "free" elections in the Dominican Republic in 1966 only in the sense that you could vote freely for Balaguer--or else!





CATHY SUNSHINE

Grenadian "heroes" painted on wall overlooking St. George's. Maurice Bishop is third from left. To Bishop's left is his father, Rupert Bishop, who was killed by Gairy's police in 1974. To his right is Tubal Uriah Butler, a Grenadian who led militant trade union struggles in Trinidad in the 1930s.

Elections are not yet scheduled for Grenada, but the U.S. is already hard at work creating the proper atmosphere to ensure that elections go "our way". This is being done through what the military calls psychological operations or "PSYOPS". Grenada's only radio station has been taken over by U.S. psychological warfare specialists from Fort Bragg, while the only printed information available is issued under U.S. control. The streets of St. George's are plastered with posters of Bernard Coard and Hudson Austin, blindfolded and in their underwear, with captions saying "These criminals attempted to sell Grenada out to the communists."

But it is not Coard and Austin who are the main targets of the PSYOP campaign; it is Bishop. "The specter of Maurice Bishop hangs as an unanswered question over this little island," noted Washington Post correspondent Edward Cody. The Reagan administration acknowledges the obvious --that Maurice Bishop was popular-- and is deeply concerned with the problem of how to dispel his memory, which they regard as dangerous to U.S. plans. According to Latin America Regional Report, U.S. propaganda expert Mark Krischik has been brought in to smear the image of Bishop, presenting him as "a communist... no better than the men in Richmond Hill prison." (i.e., Coard and Austin). Many Grenadians believe that U.S. officials'

continued refusal to say whether they have positively identified the body of Bishop is a deliberate attempt to avoid giving substance to his memory in the eyes of the people.

The U.S. press has reported ad nauseum the joyful welcome which Grenadians allegedly gave the U.S. invaders. What is now becoming clear is that this welcome was based on the mistaken idea that the U.S. forces had benignly come to rescue Grenada from Bishop's assassins---the RMC--and that they would leave after having routed Austin and Coard. As the U.S. occupation enters its third month, however, visitors to the island report that few Grenadians still entertain such illusions.

While part of the Grenadian welcome was genuine, it is worth recalling the superficial friendliness of the population of Santo Domingo toward the U.S. occupation forces. The sublimation of fear and hatred was vividly reflected in T-shirts worn around the city in August 1965 which read "Vete Yanqui y llevame contigo." (Get Out Yankee and Take Me With You.) Fear is the common denominator of the many contradictions which mark an occupied country. Elections held in Grenada will be determined not by any real political choice, but by the overwhelming presence in Grenadian affairs of the world's largest military power.

PART SIX

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CARIBBEAN REGION



The last U.S. combat troops left Grenada on December 15, within the 60-day limit specified by the War Powers Resolution. Ironically, their departure coincided with emerging signs of a "new order" in the Caribbean featuring U.S. involvement on an unprecedented scale.

Key elements of this new order include:

- Grenada brought fully under U.S. control through a combination of aid and repression. Although the combat troops went home, a 300-man force designated "non-combat" remained in place, including psychological operations battalions. The 392-man Caribbean Peace Force also stayed on the island.
- A witchhunt against left parties and individuals throughout the region, in an atmosphere of violent McCarthyism.
- For the first time, significant amounts of aid may be allocated for Washington's "allies" in the English-speaking Caribbean, i.e. for the states which joined the invasion. They have long been pleading with the Reagan administration for something more substantial than the paltry levels of assistance in the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
- The U.S. will consider funding an inter-island military force of the same states, formalizing the reactionary axis brought into play by the Grenada invasion.
- Regional unity between Caribbean countries will be subordinated to alliances dictated by the political needs of the United States. Renewed attempts will probably be made to restructure CARICOM to reflect Washington's influence.
- U.S. influence will formally and openly replace Britain's role in the Caribbean as patron of formerly British colonies.

This emerging order represents a marriage of interests between the Reagan administration and the conservative politicians of the English-speaking Caribbean. All strongly desire a purge of leftist and progressive elements from the region. Around the Caribbean, left parties and groups (many with platforms reminiscent of Grenada's New Jewel Movement) came in for

heavy public attack in the weeks that followed the invasion. Individuals in at least one country (Barbados) were detained by the police and their homes searched simply for belonging to a progressive political party. In other islands, left leaders were reportedly underground or considering personal security in light of threats against them.

Like the Reagan administration, the conservative prime ministers see the invasion as a signal to the left and as a turning point in their own political fortunes, buffeted by frustrated popular expectations and widespread economic hardship in the region. Said St. Lucian Prime Minister John Compton...

We have sent a message to all of them that no man with a gun can ever hijack any country again. They won't threaten us with coups anymore, because Grenada is no longer there, Cuba can't help them no more, and now we have the stars and stripes to protect us against them.

The boldest witchhunter has been Edward Seaga, who is riding high on his role in the Grenada invasion. Shortly after the invasion, Seaga went on Jamaican radio and television and threatened "a shattering offensive that will once and for all settle any dilemma that may exist in the minds of some as to whether saboteurs and traitors will be allowed the opportunity to destroy our country."

He named 25 Jamaicans--including several from the Workers Party of Jamaica but the majority from the centrist Peoples National Party (PNP), the party of Michael Manley--who he accused of having traveled in 1983 to Cuba, Grenada, or the Soviet Union. In allegations which provoked widespread ridicule, the Prime Minister claimed that the Workers Party of Jamaica had instructions from Havana to subvert his government and that the party had been recruiting Jamaicans to go and fight alongside Grenadians during the U.S. assault. He also claimed that a Soviet plot existed to kill members of his government, and expelled four Soviet diplomats and a Cuban journalist from the country.



President Reagan and Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga at the White House, where Seaga was presented with the "American Friendship Medal" in 1981.

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica also faces pervasive domestic discontent, as she has been unable to keep election promises to secure aid and investment for her poverty-stricken island. She is now attempting to have the island's House of Assembly pass a draconian treason law, imposing death by hanging on anyone convicted of "forming an intention to overthrow the government by force of arms" or anyone who "adheres to enemies of the state." Further vague provisions threaten imprisonment for anyone who "knows of" such an intention and does not reveal it. While the legislation has not yet been considered by the Assembly, it will probably be passed and brandished as intimidation against Dominica's small indigenous left.

Charles has been the most explicit in detailing the payoff that the Caribbean leaders expect for their role in the invasion. "It is going to mean more aid for us," she said. "I think America must recognize that we will require it." She has also been the most adept at playing the "communist threat" trump card that guarantees the interest of the Reagan administration. She told a visiting U.S. Congressional delegation that Cuban, North Korean, and Libyan subversion was a threat to the region, particularly the "Libyan threat" which was "pretty bad". Charles also claimed that the Bishop government had a four-stage plan to take over the islands in the region, of which three stages had failed. She gave no further details, but linked the alleged plot with her own domestic opposition.

In Barbados, the Tom Adams government has expelled the progressive editor of a Bridgetown-based paper, Caribbean Contact, the monthly organ of the Caribbean Conference of Churches. The editor, Rickey Singh, a Guyanese, had criticized the invasion and the role of the Caribbean governments in the action. In revoking Singh's Barbados work permit, the Adams government signaled clearly that dissent—even dissent unconnected with any political party or movement—is to come under increasing repression.

On November 15, Adams spoke before the Barbadian Parliament and unleashed a vehement attack on the Caribbean Conference of Churches (CCC). The CCC, an

No evidence was offered for any of the allegations, and even Seaga's supporters treated them as hardly credible. But the overall gamble was successful in terms of whipping up a fear of communism throughout the island, and distracting Jamaicans from the country's very serious economic problems. In a maneuver with disturbing implications for the Caribbean, Seaga took advantage of the hysteria to call snap elections, effectively turning Jamaica into a one-party state.

Seaga had been elected in 1980 and elections were constitutionally due again in 1985. However, under the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy inherited from Britain, the ruling party can call national elections at any time and theoretically secure another 5-year mandate. By advancing the 1985 election to December 15, 1983, Seaga gave the opposition Peoples National Party less than two weeks to line up candidates to contest parliamentary seats. He also broke a public promise to opposition leader Michael Manley that elections would not be held until the electoral rolls had been revised to include 180,000 new voters between the ages of 18 and 21, and remove the names of dead and migrated persons. Citing the broken promise, the PNP boycotted the elections, resulting in all 60 seats going to JLP candidates and the loss of any opposition voice in the Parliament.

ecumenical grouping of Protestant and Catholic denominations in the region, had issued a public statement condemning the invasion. Adams confirmed the expulsion of Rickey Singh and implied that two more officials of the CCC who are not Barbadian nationals might also be expelled from the country.

The CCC bases its stance regarding the invasion on the "Zone of Peace" resolution which has been passed twice by the ecumenical body, most recently in October 1982. The resolution, which has been agreed to at least informally by most Caribbean governments, calls for a policy of military non-intervention among Caribbean territories and from outside the region. It requests that the entire Caribbean be designated a "zone of peace", free of all foreign military bases and foreign military maneuvers.


The CCC's stand on the invasion was therefore perfectly consistent with its own previously-stated position agreed to by all its member churches. But in the McCarthyite atmosphere after the invasion, no one is immune to the charge of "communist sympathizer", "alien element", or "subversive". In a disturbing reminder of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) exposure hearings of the 1950s, the Jamaican prime minister says he plans to "spotlight" persons who travel to Cuba or the Soviet Union so that they would have to "explain what their visits are all about." Such travel is not against the law in Jamaica.

Isolated and discredited, the progressive movement in the Caribbean has been dealt a serious setback. In time it should

recover, however, because the alternatives it proposes offer genuine hope for a new kind of development, which may succeed where the old methods have consistently failed.

What may not recover is the Caribbean's own unity and sense of dignity. The Grenada invasion has split the region, particularly within the English-speaking Caribbean community, CARICOM. The four most important members of CARICOM (because of their larger economies) are Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana. This foursome was split down the middle by the Grenada situation, with Trinidad and Guyana opposing the invasion, while Jamaica and Barbados were instrumental in making it happen. This resulted in a "row" between Trinidad and Barbados in which the Tom Adams government at one point asked Trinidad to recall its resident envoy in Bridgetown.

CARICOM, considered moribund until 1982's relatively successful meetings in Kingston and Port-of-Spain, now faces renewed obstacles due to these divisions and to the Reagan administration's new dominance of regional affairs. The danger is that U.S. clients like Seaga and Adams will succeed in subordinating CARICOM and Caribbean unity to their bilateral alliances with the United States. Adams of Barbados made a clear gesture in this direction when he attempted to make Bridgetown the venue for the CARICOM emergency summit convened to consider the Grenada situation the weekend before the invasion. When this was rejected--since CARICOM meetings are always held in the country whose leader chairs the organization, currently Trinidad--Adams



did not bother to attend the summit, but stayed in Barbados instead to finalize plans with the United States for the invasion.

Reagan's close ally Seaga is now readying a proposal for "CARICOM 2", a restructured group which would exclude Guyana--a strident critic of the invasion--but permit the inclusion of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, countries regarded as aligned with Washington. Because the latter are not English-speaking countries, including them in CARICOM would mean a redefinition of the organization, from a group of countries with a common language and history to a group of countries politically aligned with the United States.

The impact of the invasion has also been felt within the British Commonwealth, consisting of Britain and its former colonies and dominions which have achieved independence. At the recent Commonwealth summit, the heads of government were bitterly divided over their position on the invasion, taking a week to reach a compromise. As with CARICOM, the Commonwealth has seen its importance downgraded as Reagan's Caribbean partners set their own agendas. Edward Seaga, the prime minister of Jamaica, did not even attend November's summit in New Delhi, where the Grenada invasion was discussed. Instead, he stayed home to prepare his snap election, seemingly oblivious to the debate which swirled around his and the other leaders' recent action.

In effect, the Grenada invasion has forced the tiny countries of the Caribbean to choose sides. In doing so, they may have

temporarily enhanced their security vis-a-vis their powerful neighbor to the north, but they have also isolated themselves in the larger international context. The states which helped Reagan invade Grenada are now looked upon as traitors and pawns of the United States by most of the world.

They are isolated in the United Nations: Barbados suffered a pointed diplomatic defeat in its bid for a seat on the U.N. Security Council, polling only 38 votes, compared to 106 for Peru. In the Organization of American States, the membership was divided, with loyal Reagan allies (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Chile and Paraguay) defending the invasion along with the participating Caribbean states, while most of the other members opposed it. While there was no formal condemnation, the representatives of Barbados, Jamaica and the other invaders received the cold shoulder from a number of their colleagues in the halls of the OAS.

Caribbean unity, Latin American regionalism, and Third World dignity are thus the ultimate victims of the Grenada invasion--as indeed they were its real targets. When informed that the overwhelming majority of the U.N. General Assembly had condemned the U.S. action, President Reagan simply announced that the news had not upset his breakfast, at all. It was the essence of the man, and symptomatic of the disease which afflicts the United States' relations with other nations. Not only does the United States refuse to accept the sovereignty and ideological pluralism of countries in its "backyard"; we have become incapable of



Leaders chat at CARICOM summit in November 1982: (l-r) Grenada Prime Min. Maurice Bishop, Antigua Prime Min. Vere Bird, Montserrat chief minister John Osborne, Guyana President Forbes Burnham.

EVERYBODY'S MAGAZINE

dealing with other nations, particularly Third World nations, on a basis of equality and respect.

While there are numerous parallels between the invasions of the Dominican Republic and Grenada, the implications of the latter are more far-reaching. The Dominican intervention was essentially confined to one island, whereas the Grenada action was the kickoff for the consolidation of U.S. control over the entire region, and a warning that anyone

who resists this new order will be crushed. The Reagan administration justifies this whole process in terms of national security. It is worth remembering, however, that the Dominican invasion bitterly alienated the Third World from the United States; and that the United States now stands more isolated in the world than ever before. In the end, it is this isolation which threatens our security, and which the American people must reverse. ■

THEY SAID IT..

Administration officials said yesterday that they were monitoring the situation in Grenada with concern as 21 Navy ships steamed toward the Caribbean island, but several said there were no plans for action now.

Two aides traveling with President Reagan in Augusta, Ga., said that the ships, originally bound for Lebanon, were sent to the area only to protect Americans if necessary and that no invasion is planned. WASHINGTON POST, SUNDAY OCTOBER 23, 1983.

About 50 U.S. Marines landed (in Barbados) today and immediately flew off in three helicopters...the Americans said that the Marines might be used to help take Americans off the troubled island of Grenada. "What you are seeing could be used as part one of the options to effect a departure of the Americans and to ensure their security," U.S. Embassy spokesman Mike Morgan said. He declined to elaborate. ASSOCIATED PRESS, MONDAY OCTOBER 24, 1983.

Pentagon spokesmen said last night that they have no information about an Associated Press report from Barbados, about 150 miles from Grenada, that 50 U.S. Marines arrived in Barbados yesterday in a Navy transport jet. The spokesman also said that they knew of no plans for U.S. military action in Grenada but added that the United States is concerned and monitoring conditions there. WASHINGTON POST, TUESDAY OCTOBER 25, 1983.

"We want (U.S. forces) to be out of there as quickly as possible because this--our purpose in being there is only for them to enable to take over their own affairs." PRESIDENT REAGAN, TUESDAY OCTOBER 25, 1983.